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Article 
TEACHING PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF 
OCTOMOM:  ENHANCING CASE/SOCRATIC 
METHOD WITH STRUCTURED CLASS 
DISCUSSION 
Constance Anastopoulo and Thomas P. Gressette, Jr. * 
Ann Curry:  So you’re saying you have no income coming in? 
Nadya Suleman:  At the moment, no. 1 
 
The fact that a woman now has the option to create eight embryos 
and carry them to term in a single pregnancy is a miracle made possible 
only by technology.2  It is quite another matter that a woman with no job 
and six children of her own would exercise that option and then rely on 
government assistance to financially support all fourteen of her children.    
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As technology empowers individuals to impact community 
resources in ways never contemplated by the law, society will have to 
address how, or whether, it will protect reproductive freedom when the 
exercise of that freedom alters the allocation of community resources.3  
Questions about the applicability of current definitions of privacy, 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law; J.D., University of North 
Carolina School of Law.   
 Adjunct Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law; J.D., University of South 
Carolina School of Law; Litigation Attorney, Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, 
LLC, Charleston, S.C. The views expressed in this Article are solely my own and not those 
of Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC or any of the firm’s clients. 
 The Authors would like to thank Sheila Sheuerman (Charleston School of Law) and 
William J. Quirk (University of South Carolina School of Law) for their helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this Article.  In addition, we would like to thank Julie Craig, Brian Kern, 
Randi Lynn Shelley, and Michael Wright for their research assistance.  Errors and 
omissions are ours alone.  Also, we thank Akim and Hunter without whom this would not 
be possible. 
1 Interview with Nadya Suleman, NBC Television Broadcast (Feb. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29129311%20/ppage/5/. 
2 See The Science Behind Giving Birth To Octuplets, CBS2 LOS ANGELES, Jan. 31, 2009, 
http://cbs2.com/health/octuplets.multiple.high.2.923397.html.   
3 Steven Edmondson, Eight is Enough! A Constitutional Argument for Regulating Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER:  HEALTH LAW PERSPECTIVES, 
Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/(SE)%20eight.pdf.  
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individuals’ freedom to harness technological advances in reproduction, 
and scarcity of resources will refine concepts of personal liberty and will 
force Americans to consider which branch of government should define 
those liberties.4   
None of the three branches of American government will be able to 
promulgate rules or laws fast enough to keep up with the questions 
posed by advances in areas such as assisted reproduction.  Years will 
pass as legislators coin phrases like “excessive reproduction”5 and then 
finally, after cases have worked through the courts, perhaps judges will 
write about issues of “state interest in protecting already born children” 
in case law intended to tell the American public how and when private 
rights must yield to the rights of others.  Americans will need guidance 
long before the courts, legislatures, or executive agencies resolve these 
issues, and they will turn to tomorrow’s lawyers for answers.   
This Article uses the highly publicized story of Nadya Suleman’s 
technologically-assisted conception of octuplets to illustrate the need for 
new ways to teach privacy to law students.  Traditional case/Socratic 
method provides a foundation for teaching the law of privacy, but 
casebooks alone are inadequate to prepare law students to answer the 
privacy questions created by rapidly changing technology. 
Part II of this Article provides a history of teaching privacy to law 
students.  Part III considers which teaching methods are best suited to 
teaching privacy to today’s law students and concludes that the optimal 
method is the case/Socratic method combined with structured class 
discussion.  Part IV considers the characteristics of modern law students, 
summarizes the relevant facts of Nadya Suleman’s conception and 
delivery of octuplets, and combines a respected casebook’s presentation 
of relevant legal rulings with the Authors’ four guideposts for classroom 
discussion.  It demonstrates how incorporating structured class 
discussion of case law creates the most effective means of teaching law 
students how to analyze the questions raised by the intersection of 
technology and individual privacy rights.  
                                                 
4 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY:  TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY xi (1995) (“apprehension about invasion of privacy . . . and public concern 
prompt legislative inquiries and the introduction of legislation”). 
5 See THEODOOR H. VAN DE VELDE, FERTILITY AND STERILITY IN MARRIAGE 65–68 (2006) 
(discussing excessive reproduction and the need to bring the issue to the attention of 
legislators). 
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II.  A HISTORY OF TEACHING THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
The first step toward presenting privacy law was discussion-based 
classes on the law and issues of gender difference.6  These first classes 
were seminars at the margin of core law classes primarily utilizing 
articles, essays, literature, and reading lists as the textbooks.7  Employing 
methods strikingly similar to the combination method endorsed by the 
Authors of this Article, these classes were designed to present law 
students with questions that require them to think outside traditional 
legal analysis.8   
One of the first textbooks on gender and the law was Sex 
Discrimination and the Law:  Causes and Remedies by Barbara Allen 
Babcock, Anne E. Freeman, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and Susan Deller 
Ross, published in 1975.9  This textbook was based on material from a 
handout generated for one of the first conferences on this subject entitled 
Women and the Law held in 1971.10  This packet suggested a reading list 
for these first feminist legal scholars as a way to initiate discussion.11  As 
this early textbook illustrates, feminist activities focused on legal issues 
began with the campaign for women’s legal rights, including the right to 
contract, property rights, and women’s suffrage in the late 1800s and the 
early 1900s.12  As the women’s movement for legal rights experienced 
success, the agenda encompassed broader legal issues and social equality 
for women.  These early scholars on feminism and the law focused on 
the issues presented by sex discrimination practices, which included 
attempts to regulate sexual activity by state legislatures and courts.13  In 
fact, it was the attempt to regulate sexual conduct through access to 
contraception that ushered in the new era of what modern educators 
teach as the right to privacy.14 
                                                 
6 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:  PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY ix 
(Rowman & Littlefield 1988). 
7 See Linda K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 429, 430 
(2002) (giving a more thorough analysis of the discussion classes related to the law and 
issues of gender difference). 
8 Id.  
9 See id. at 430 (citing generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, ANN E. FREEDMAN, ELEANOR 
NORTON, & SUSAN DELLER ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW:  CAUSES AND REMEDIES 
(1975)). 
10 See id. at 431 (citing generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION 
AND THE LAW:  CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975)). 
11 Id. at 430. 
12 See id. at 431–33. 
13 See id. at 434–37. 
14 Christine Intromasso, Note, Reproductive Self-Determination in the Third Circuit:  The 
Statutory Proscription of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims as an Unconstitutional 
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The 1965 United States Supreme Court opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut15 announced the concept of “zones of privacy” and became 
the foundation for a new line of case law.16  As later courts began to 
incorporate the issue of “zones of privacy” and the boundaries between 
private-public domains were expanded and defined, so too did the study 
of sexuality, gender, and the law.17  New cases then filled the pages of 
casebooks for what is now taught as the law of privacy.  However, as 
cases were decided in these areas, seminar classes transitioned into more 
traditional law school classes because teachers were able to utilize 
traditional case law analysis to teach the subject.  Naturally, casebooks 
then became necessary.18  Next, casebooks covering gender became 
larger, and sections of those texts discussing reproductive rights and 
other topics evolved into independent courses.19 
III.  TEACHING METHODS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO TEACHING  
THE MODERN INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY 
Traditionally, privacy law was about insulated, personal rights and 
when those rights were protected from government interference.20  
Reading judicial opinions organized into casebooks is currently the most 
widely used method to teach law students the specific lines between 
private and unprotected activities.  Technology, however, is changing 
the way in which people exercise their rights, and once-exact lines 
delineated in these texts are much less clear today.21 
Teaching privacy law exclusively from casebooks is simply 
insufficient to teach law students how to thoroughly analyze issues at 
the intersection of privacy and technology.  Consequently, we must 
modify the way we teach privacy.  To find the best options for teaching 
                                                                                                             
Violation of Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
101, 103–04 (2003). 
15 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
16 ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 6, at x. 
17 See Kerber, supra note 7, at 437–38. 
18 Id.  
19 See id. at 431–35. 
20 See Robert M. Bankey, Jr., Comment, Sound Rights:  Legal Protections from Audio 
Intrusions in Light of Directional Sound Technology, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 309, 339 
(2008). 
21 See Sabu M. George, Millions of Missing Girls:  From Fetal Sexing to High Technology Sex 
Selection in India, 26 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 604, 605–08 (2006) (discussing how the advances 
of assisted reproductive technologies and embryology have enabled selective implantation 
of embryos of a desired sex and its greater implications on Indian society); see also Julie 
Manning Magid et al., Radio Frequency Identification and Privacy Law:  An Integrative 
Approach, 46 AM. BUS. L.J., Spring 2009, at 4 (discussing radio frequency identification’s 
impact on modern privacy law). 
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this rapidly changing subject in the future, we turn to the main teaching 
methods in use at American law schools. 
There are four main teaching methods: case/Socratic, textbook and 
lecture, problem, and simulation/role play.22  Because each method has 
unique characteristics, some methods are more naturally suited to 
certain kinds of subjects.23  However, while these methods are most often 
thought of as separate, applying them in tandem is also a valid option.24  
That is, in fact, what the Authors suggest in the following section, which 
presents a primer on the pros and cons of each method in order to 
demonstrate aspects of the methods properly suited to teaching privacy 
law. 
A. Case/Socratic Method25 
The most recognized and utilized teaching method in modern law 
schools is the case/Socratic method.26  In fact, it is so closely intertwined 
with the profession that it is nearly synonymous with legal education.27  
This discussion begins with the case/Socratic pedagogy because it 
addresses the core teaching method of most law schools’ initial phase of 
instruction.28  
Functionally, the case/Socratic method is the simplest to employ.  
First, casebooks illustrate the rules of law, allowing students to draw 
upon those rules to form conclusions based upon hypothetical situations 
posed by the professor.29  Second, the case/Socratic method may be used 
in a large class, allowing the teacher control over the class and 
discussion.30  Finally, the case/Socratic method is relatively easy for the 
teacher to update through the addition of recent significant cases once 
the initial materials have been collected.31 
                                                 
22 James Eagar, Comment, The Right Tool for the Job:  The Effective Use of Pedagogical 
Methods In Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 389, 398 (1996–97). 
23 Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach:  A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law 
Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1996). 
24 Id.  
25 See Eagar, supra note 22, at 399 (“The original purpose of the case method and 
accompanying Socratic questioning . . . [is] to teach students how to ‘think like a lawyer.’”).  
Consequently, the case and Socratic methods operate symbiotically.  Id.  For purposes of 
this discussion, the methods used together will be referred to as the case/Socratic method. 
26 See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 23 (2007). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 47. 
29 Paul Bateman, Toward Diversity in Teaching Methods in Law Schools:  Five Suggestions 
from the Back Row, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 397, 414 (1997). 
30 Id. at 403. 
31 Eagar, supra note 22, at 403. 
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Proponents of the case/Socratic method tout its ability to teach 
students how to “think like a lawyer,” focusing on the analysis of legal 
theory.32  The “critical tactic of the method is to seek continual 
clarification of a proposition or definition by testing it with alternative 
conflicting possibilities.”33  While the case/Socratic method has 
remained entrenched in legal education and dominates law teaching, its 
limitations are well documented.34 
Critics of the case/Socratic method argue that while it does teach 
some of the skills needed by lawyers, using it exclusively neglects other 
practical “lawyering” skills.35  When so much of a legal education is 
based on a single pedagogy, it can create an imbalance by focusing on 
the content of individual cases rather than the larger legal theory or 
principle.36  Detractors of this method also claim that since participation 
of the student is an essential feature of this method, the reality of class 
size (law school classes are often quite large) and the resulting 
diminished participation by each student greatly hinders its 
effectiveness.37  Although the case/Socratic method sometimes is used to 
demean or degrade students, it appears that the more abusive 
interrogations have declined; however, it is recognized that this method 
may hinder female participation in class discussion.38 
The case/Socratic method has many strengths, but it also has many 
weaknesses, particularly when used as an exclusive teaching method.  
Some professors, like the Authors here, advocate supplementing the 
method with other forms of active learning.39 
Legal scholars who advocate moving away from the case/Socratic 
method claim that by making legal learning more “realistic, concrete and 
varied . . . the concepts are often made more understandable by 
example.”40  These advocates claim that utilizing the case/Socratic 
method is counter to many important strategies of effective teaching 
because it is premised upon challenging every student response.41  
                                                 
32 Bateman, supra note 29, at 401. 
33 Eagar, supra note 22, at 399 (quoting June Cicero, Piercing the Socratic Veil:  Adding an 
Active Learning Alternative in Legal Education, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1989)). 
34 Friedland, supra note 23, at 28.  
35 Eagar, supra note 22, at 400. 
36 SULLIVAN ET. AL., supra note 26, at 51. 
37 Eagar, supra note 22, at 401. 
38 Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions:  Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 1547, 1554 (1993). 
39 Eagar, supra note 22, at 403. 
40 Sarah E. Thiemann, Beyond Guinier:  A Critique of Legal Pedagogy, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 17, 34 (1998). 
41 Id. at 21. 
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Additionally, casebooks focus on the outcomes of cases, not on solving 
specific problems.42  
Using the case/Socratic method alone seems particularly ineffective 
in the context of teaching privacy in the modern age, especially when 
considering how technology has impacted the exercise of those rights.  
The story of Nadya Suleman presents just one example of how 
technology has so altered an established practice that it effectively calls 
personal rights into question in a way not contemplated by established 
case law.  Without more than Socratic questioning, students will not be 
able to move beyond the rules of their casebooks. 
B. Textbook and Lecture 
As an alternative to the case/Socratic method, some scholars suggest 
the textbook and lecture method, particularly during the second and 
third years of law school.43  The concept of the textbook and lecture 
method is fairly simple—textbooks are written to “systematize and 
summarize course content, combined with problems.”44  The content of 
the textbook is then discussed in a classroom setting.45  
The case/Socratic method utilizes actual edited opinions from cases 
and is premised on the idea of surprise and thinking on one’s feet.46  In 
contrast, the textbook and lecture method provides and conveys the 
material in a way that sets forth essential rules and is arguably similar to 
the information in supplemental materials and commercial outlines often 
purchased and used by students.47 
Critics of the textbook and lecture method assert it is often 
considered a dull method of teaching and is “probably the least effective 
method in helping students to retain information and develop a practical 
level of understanding.”48  Yet in the context of teaching privacy law, the 
textbook and lecture methodology presents limitations similar to those of 
the case/Socratic method.  The inert nature of the textbook, which 
simply summarizes and organizes course content, cannot address the 
dynamic nature of this evolving area of law. 
                                                 
42 See John S. Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education:  The Potential for Implementing the 
Maccrate Report’s Recommendations for Curricular Reform, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 363, 384 (1994). 
43 Eagar, supra note 22, at 403. 
44 Id. at 409. 
45 Id. 
46 Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method:  It’s Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 241, 250 (1992). 
47 Eagar, supra note 22, at 409. 
48 Id. at 410. 
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C. Problem Method 
Another teaching method used in law schools is the problem 
method.  This method has three essential features.  The first aspect is the 
problem, which “involves several issues cutting across several cases and 
statutes . . . and is meant to resemble a complex situation that a lawyer 
might face in practice.”49  Regardless of whether the problem is framed 
in the context of litigation, negotiations, drafting, or planning, the first 
step is to develop a defined set of goals.50  Second, the student must 
approach the problem from a “specified role, such as advocate, judge, 
advisor, planner or similar role.”51  Third, “the problem is the focus of 
the class discussion,” allowing the students to utilize cases, statutes, and 
other tools to analyze the problem from the assigned perspective.52  
Advocates of the problem method point to the benefits of having 
students apply a full range of abstract principles.53  Proponents claim 
that the problem method incorporates the advantages of the 
case/Socratic method in terms of legal reasoning because it includes 
issue recognition and analysis, decision-making, and identifying the 
relationship between theory and practice.54  More importantly, advocates 
assert that the problem method surpasses the case/Socratic method by 
teaching students to ask relevant questions that lead to problem-solving 
and actionable decisions.55  In other words, the problem method is 
effective because it demonstrates to students that by asking the right 
questions and applying pertinent data to new situations, they learn how 
to find their own answers to legal problems, rather than by simply 
reading how others found answers.56  Professors contend that the 
problem method develops a greater student comfort level with both 
statutory interpretation and case analysis.57  Consequently, the problem 
method has been found to be particularly well-suited for code-oriented 
courses. 
When considering how to apply the problem method to teaching a 
rapidly changing subject like privacy and technology, it is clear that the 
presentation of a problem is created by the modern factual situation at 
                                                 
49 Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 250. 
50 Michael P. Allen, Making Legal Education Relevant to Our Students One Step at a Time:  
Using the Group Project to Teach Personal Jurisdiction in Civil Procedure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 
133, 136 (2004). 
51 Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 250. 
52 Id. 
53 Allen, Making Legal Education, supra note 50, at 139. 
54 Eagar, supra note 22, at 404. 
55 SULLIVAN ET. AL., supra note 26, at 199. 
56 See Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 245. 
57 Allen, Making Legal Education, supra note 50, at 145. 
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issue.  However, because constitutional rules of law cannot be stated 
succinctly in a manner that allows immediate application to a limited 
fact pattern, issues are not easily crafted into a neatly resolved problem.  
That being said, the discussion element of the method can be an 
invaluable tool if integrated into a lesson with case method. 
D. Role Play/Simulation 
A similar method used in law school classrooms is role 
play/simulation.58  This method is used more extensively in clinical legal 
education, but can be used effectively in the classroom.59  “The use of 
simulation is based on the maxim that students learn best not [from] 
what they hear or see, but [by] what they do.”60  Proponents of this 
method claim it encourages creative thinking and active participation 
while minimizing anxiety.61  Advocates claim that case simulations 
integrate theory, doctrine, and practice—students use all of these skills 
when they participate fully in the simulation, thereby gaining practical 
training in creative problem solving, legal research, negotiation skills, 
and litigation skills.62  In other words, this method is designed to train 
professionals and is more similar to education paradigms utilized in 
other professional schools such as medicine and business.63 
Concerns about role play/simulation as a method arise in course 
coverage and the ability of the class to cover the necessary content to 
effectively teach the subject matter.64  For teaching privacy law, role 
play/simulation is ineffective because the subject matter is complex and 
students need basic knowledge of applicable law.  Without the 
integration of the casebook method, particularly the study of seminal 
cases establishing the right to privacy, students cannot understand the 
evolution of the right from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman65 to 
our modern conception. 
E. An Alternative 
Elements of the case/Socratic method combined with aspects of the 
problem method and structured class discussion provide the best 
combination of elements for teaching privacy in the context of rapidly 
                                                 
58 Thiemann, supra note 40, at 35. 
59 Eagar, supra note 22, at 407. 
60 Id. 
61 Thiemann, supra note 40, at 35–37. 
62 Eagar, supra note 22, at 408–09. 
63 Moskovitz, supra note 46, at 241. 
64 Eagar, supra note 22, at 408. 
65 See generally Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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advancing technology.  Additionally, certain considerations about 
modern law students require this creative combination of teaching 
methods.66  The guideposts set forth in Part IV demonstrate how the 
application of these methods prepares law students to address modern 
privacy issues, including how technology is redefining our personal 
rights and changing the allocation of collective resources. 
IV. TEACHING PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF OCTOMOM—A LESSON PLAN FOR 
COMBINING ELEMENTS OF CASE / SOCRATIC METHOD WITH STRUCTURED 
CLASS DISCUSSION 
A. Return to the Roundtable 
Early textbooks in the field of legal gender studies (and therefore 
ultimately privacy) included not only cases, but also historical and 
sociological materials and even magazine articles.67  Discussion and 
integration using the problem solving method were necessary in the 
early studies because this allowed scholars to theorize about issues of 
equality and autonomy.68  Questions were numerous, and cases 
answering them were few; students had no alternative to working 
together to find solutions to problems.  As cases worked their way 
through the courts and the law developed, the teaching style in this 
subject area changed as well.69  With more court opinions addressing 
specific fact patterns and issues, the focus shifted away from discussion 
of the large-scale issues to analysis of the decisions and dicta in the cases, 
particularly as these lawsuits broke new ground and laid the foundation 
for privacy rights.70  Feminist legal scholars began to scrutinize the 
language of the cases in an attempt to discern the direction of trends in 
the law.71  As these academics concentrated on the activities of the 
women’s movement and the results of their litigation campaigns, 
teaching moved away from theory and discussion to one of analyzing 
social equality as legal demands.72  
Just as it once was with women’s issues and the law, many 
complicated issues of technology and privacy simply have not yet been 
decided.  At the beginning of this process, we lack answers and find it 
                                                 
66  See infra Part IV.B. 
67 Kerber, supra note 7, at 434. 
68 Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., Race and Gender in the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 27, 
44–45 (2006). 
69 Id. at 45. 
70 Id. at 45–50. 
71 Id. at 51. 
72 Cynthia Grant Bowman, Dorothy Roberts & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Race and Gender 
in the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 27, 45 (2006). 
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necessary to return to the roundtable, asking law students to think 
creatively and to think ahead of the cases we know will soon populate 
the pages of casebooks.   
Understanding privacy as a legal concept is not a simple 
undertaking.  Some scholars have proposed teaching the law of personal 
liberties as a separate Advanced Constitutional Law class, premised on 
the idea that a student must first have some understanding of 
constitutional law before undertaking study of privacy.73 To understand 
privacy, students must understand due process, fundamental rights and 
equal protection, and free expression.74  Learning at the roundtable 
affords students the opportunity to more fully understand advanced 
concepts and to move beyond the basics to apply the concepts to new 
situations created by new technologies. 
In contemplating the Nadya Suleman story, including the role 
technology played in creating these issues, a return to the use of 
discussion and thoughtful questioning as a tool of analysis provides a 
dynamic and fluid device to consider this rapidly changing area.  
Additionally, this method allows incorporation of other areas of privacy 
rights.  
B. Consider the Age and Experience of Modern Law Students 
To effectively teach law students, professors must understand the 
assumptions they bring to the analysis.  Those assumptions condition 
their willingness and ability to consider new theory.  Some assumptions 
may be false or inapplicable; some may require reexamination in light of 
present circumstances.  Modern American law students increasingly 
subscribe to the widespread assumption that their bodies are their own 
and therefore protected, whether as a “right to bodily integrity,” or a 
“right to privacy,” or a “right to autonomy.”75  Of course, just because 
modern law students “know” these truths does not mean they were 
always so clear. 
Roe v. Wade, “the watershed for both U.S. abortion rights and the 
right to privacy,”76 is perhaps the most debated privacy case in America, 
so understanding how modern law students understand Roe is essential 
to effectively teaching privacy.  The following discussion examines 
                                                 
73 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 
xix (2d ed. 2004). 
74 Id.  
75 See Jonathan Herring & P.-L. Chau, My Body, Your Body, Our Bodies, 15 MED. L. REV. 
34, 34 (2007). 
76 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1218 (2001). 
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implications of modern law students’ exposure to privacy issues, 
particularly Roe. 
1. Consider the Students’ Age 
More than half of law students today were born after 1985—twelve 
or thirteen years after Roe was decided in 1973.77  They have never 
experienced a world without the right of choice pronounced in Roe.  
Stated another way, more than half of tomorrow’s lawyers have always 
experienced the issue of abortion in terms of a choice, an opportunity 
(whether morally right or wrong) guaranteed by a United States 
Supreme Court that recognizes a right of privacy.  Whether pro-choice or 
pro-life, these future lawyers have never known a world in which 
Americans did not have a certain zone of privacy that cannot, absent 
certain circumstances, be disturbed by the state.78  Finally, and most 
importantly, the limits on governmental interference with abortion (and 
therefore citizens’ privacy) have been specifically defined by case law 
that reinforces these students’ underlying assumption that certain 
choices and activities are, at least at some points in time, free from 
governmental interference.79   
2. Consider How the Students Have Debated Privacy Because that 
Debate Shapes How They Approach and Perceive the Issue  
The rhetoric law students heard as they matured shapes how they 
approach privacy issues, so some attention to politicized debate is 
necessary to properly teach modern law students about the intersection 
of law and technology. 
The world that modern law students “know” and their exposure to 
abortion issues focuses primarily on rhetoric aimed to reframe Roe and to 
make political and religious discussions out of the right to privacy.80  On 
one side of the debate, pro-life advocates adhere to a principle of moral 
                                                 
77 Phil Handwerk, Analysis of Law School Applicants by Age Group, Law School 
Admissions Council, Sept. 2007, http://members.lsac.org/Public/MainPage.aspx? 
ReturnUrl=%2fPrivate%2fMainPage2.aspx. 
78 M.N.S. Sellers, An Introduction to the Value of Autonomy in Law, 1 IUS GENTIUM 1, 8 
(2007). 
79 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
80 Paige Nelson, Note, Let the People Speak:  Terrorism, the Abortion Debate, and Reduction of 
the Jury Award in Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, 92 IOWA L. REV. 677, 682–83 (2007); Karen F.B. Gray, Comment, An Establishment 
Clause Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399, 399–400 (1990). 
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opposition to abortion at any stage in gestation.81 They argue that all 
human lives have unique value, regardless of the stage of development 
or physical health.82  The claims are often based on religion and 
encompass such arguments as the “Sanctity of Life Principle.”83 In 
addition, pro-life advocates put forth several other arguments for moral 
and religious opposition to abortion.  These arguments include, but are 
not limited to, “deprivation,” which argues that abortion deprives the 
fetus of a valuable future.84  Others argue against “discrimination”—that 
by allowing abortions, we unjustly discriminate against the unborn by 
denying that fetuses have the same right to life as all, and thereby only 
valuing some lives over others, but not all lives equally.  They argue this 
“valuation” is arbitrary, selective, and discriminatory.85  Additionally, 
advocates of the pro-life position oppose abortion on the basis of 
“personhood,” claiming that abortion is morally wrong because the fetus 
is an innocent human being.86 
Proponents claim these arguments provide a moral filter through 
which abortion must be viewed, but they are essentially arguments that 
the rights of the fetus should be afforded more consideration, requiring 
reduction of the woman’s right to choose an abortion.  Right to Life 
                                                 
81 John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion Law:  Roe’s Rejection of America’s History and 
Traditions, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 17 (2006) (citing JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 
34–35 (1978)). Professor Keown is a professor of Christian Ethics at Georgetown University 
and Visiting Professor of Law, Jurisprudence, and Bioethics at the John Paul II Institute for 
Marriage and Family, Melbourne, Australia.  He is a noted author and scholar who has 
written extensively on euthanasia and “quality of life” issues.  His writings have been cited 
in many United States Supreme Court decisions on cases involving the issues related to 
abortion. 
82 William Robert Johnston, Evaluation of the BGCT Christian Life Commission’s Abortion 
and the Christian Life (2002), http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/baptist/rptbgctc.html. 
83 See John Coggon, Problems with Claims that Sanctity Leads to ‘Pro-Life’ Law, and Reasons 
for Doubting it to be a Convincing Middle Way, 27 MED. & L. 203, 204–05 (March 2008); see also 
John Keown, Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland, 113 L.Q. REP. 481, 
482–503 (1997) (presenting a brief explanation of the principle in ethics and law). 
84 See, e.g., Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 76 J. PHIL. 183, 189–93 (1989) (arguing 
that individuals, including fetuses, who have “a future like ours,” have a right not to be 
killed). 
85 See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, HUMAN LIFE REV., 
Spring 1983, at 7, 10, available at http://www.humanlifereview.com/reagan (“[S]ocial 
acceptance of abortion . . . embrace[s] a social ethic where some human lives are valued 
and others are not.  As a nation, we must choose between the sanctity of life ethic and the 
‘quality of life’ ethic.”). 
86 See, e.g., Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 65–66 (1997) (anti-abortionists supported their claims of fetal personhood 
by the fetus’s possession of a soul, and on its human characteristics). 
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activists argue for firm moral opposition to the taking of life, defending 
the value of human life as an absolute.87 
These ideals and ideas about family and the origins of human life are 
couched in terms of concern for the unborn in arguments and legislation 
often aimed at overturning Roe.88  As this movement has gained traction, 
its impact on students must be considered, for it has influenced state 
legislatures to adopt numerous measures to make it more difficult for 
women to obtain abortions, including rules against minors obtaining 
abortions without consent of their parents, waiting periods arguably 
designed to discourage patients from carrying out their choice, refusal to 
finance abortions with state funds, and limits on public hospitals’ ability 
to provide abortion services.89  This balancing of privacy and an 
individual’s zone of control are the exact arguments that will inform 
debate over the issues in the Nadya Suleman story. 
Pro-choice advocates argue that while all of these arguments are 
premised on the idea that life is supreme, they ignore the reality that 
resources are limited, including the resources to feed and care for each 
additional life.  Pro-choice advocates contend that the pro-life argument 
incorrectly assumes that a woman’s “decision” to carry an unwanted 
child to term has a limited impact on society and that unlimited 
resources are available to care for that child.90  They contend that each 
additional child impacts not only the immediate woman/family, but also 
society as a whole, consuming scarce resources.91 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., Coggon, supra note 83, at 204–05 (the doctrine of vitalism holds that life 
should be preserved no matter what cost and how much suffering it may cause). 
88 See Reagan, supra note 85. 
89 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 835, 837–39 (1992) 
(upholding law requiring mandatory waiting periods, parental consent requirements, and 
state-scripted counseling requirements); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding 
federal regulations prohibiting family planning clinics from receiving Title X funds for 
counseling or giving referrals to women regarding abortion); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Health, 
497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statute requiring minors to notify one parent or 
obtain a judicial waiver); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (ruling 
the state need not commit any resources to facilitating abortions, and upheld a law 
restricting the use of public employees and facilities for abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
519, 521 (1977) (holding that an indigent woman had no right to obtain a non-therapeutic 
abortion at a publicly funded hospital). 
90 See generally Carrie S. Klima, Unintended Pregnancy:  Consequences and Solutions for a 
Worldwide Problem, 43 J. OF NURSE-MIDWIFERY, Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 483 (stating the need for 
abortions and that unintended pregnancies and their substantial human and dollar costs 
should be a priority for all countries). 
91 Id. at 489 (discussing unintended pregnancy as a worldwide problem that affects 
women, their families, and society). 
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By understanding the rhetoric surrounding the most widely 
discussed privacy case, we begin to understand how law students 
approach the right to privacy.   
C. Use a Reliable Casebook to Teach the Current State of the Law 
Before students can be asked to apply principles of privacy law to 
novel situations created by technological advances, they must 
understand the current state of privacy law as well as its historical 
development.  Casebooks are the best tools for presenting these facts, but 
most casebooks teach privacy as a series of rules for when the 
government can interfere with an individual’s right to make certain 
choices.  They address only the first step of analysis necessary to 
comprehend the issues at play in complicated fact patterns like those of 
the Nadya Suleman story.  Therefore, we suggest utilizing a reliable 
casebook to teach students the current state of the law of privacy and 
how it evolved to ensure a proper foundation for the discussion 
suggested in Part IV.D. 
Catharine MacKinnon’s casebook Sex Equality is highly regarded.  Its 
analysis is an example of how a casebook that thoroughly covers a 
subject area lays a foundation for examining the intersection of privacy 
and technology.92  What we refer to as the right to privacy was, of course, 
ultimately defined in the context of abortion in Roe v. Wade.93    
Discussing the development of the constitutional status of the right 
to privacy, Professor MacKinnon explains that “the first judicial step” in 
developing the right’s foundation in substantive due process was Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman94  In Ullman, the Court found a 
challenge to a state’s criminal law proscribing obtaining and using 
contraceptives was unripe because it had not been enforced against the 
plaintiffs.95  MacKinnon explains: 
 Justice Harlan dissented in terms that became 
formative, concluding that ‘a statute making it a criminal 
offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an 
intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the 
conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual’s 
personal life.’  Building on a previous Fourteenth 
                                                 
92 MACKINNON, supra note 76. 
93 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
94  MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1086 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 523 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
95 Ullman, 367 U.S. at 523 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (cited in MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 
1086). 
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Amendment case forbidding involuntary sterilization of 
prisoners convicted of some crimes but not others, he 
envisioned in the ‘larger context’ of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause a guarantee of 
‘liberty’ that extended well beyond the procedural.96 
Justice Harlan’s dissent is important because it frames the question 
in terms of “consensual behavior having little or no direct impact on 
others.”97 This succinct statement is what we come to understand about 
privacy as ultimately described in Roe98—effectively it is the foundation 
of how we now understand, and therefore teach, the modern right to 
privacy. 
Our current understanding of privacy is further illustrated by rules 
we glean from the repeal of anti-contraception laws and the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.99  Specifically, in Griswold the 
“Supreme Court discovered that ‘zones of privacy’ emanate[d] from 
several guarantees in the Bill of Rights.”100  In quoting Griswold, 
Professor MacKinnon suggests we accentuate the following: 
 This law…operates directly on an intimate relation 
of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one 
aspect of that relation…[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.  
Various guarantees create zones of privacy.  [Cases 
under the First, Fourth, fifth, and Ninth Amendments] 
bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for 
recognition here is a legitimate one.  The present case . . . 
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy 
created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees.  And it concerns a law which, in forbidding 
the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their 
manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goal by means 
having a maximum destructive impact upon that 
relationship.101 
                                                 
96 MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1086 (citations omitted). 
97 Id. at 1087 (quoting Ullman, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
98 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
99 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
100 MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1217. 
101 Id. at 1217 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–86). 
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The next step in defining the new right of privacy “discovered” in 
Griswold came in the Court’s decisions in Stanley v. Georgia102 and 
Eisenstadt v. Baird.103  As Professor MacKinnon points out: 
 Then [the Court] ruled in Stanley v. Georgia that a 
state’s power to regulate obscenity “simply does not 
extend to mere possession by the individual [of obscene 
materials] in the privacy of his home,” and invalidated 
under the Equal Protection Clause a state law that gave 
differential access to contraception to married and 
unmarried people otherwise similarly situated.  The 
zenith of this line of authority was reached in Roe v. 
Wade’s invalidation of a state criminal abortion law.   In 
Roe, the right to personal privacy, settled in the “liberty” 
component of the Due Process Clause, was held “broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy.”104  
Professors teach law students that these post-Griswold cases striking 
down state contraceptive laws essentially blazed a path to abortion 
“choice” by setting up arguments based on the reasoning that if a 
woman has the right to use contraceptives, but these contraceptives were 
not available, or they were not effective to prevent pregnancy before the 
fact, then abortion ought to be available after the fact.105 
Professor MacKinnon again reinforces the lesson that privacy rights 
are born in Roe and succinctly sums up the ultimate source for how we 
understand and teach modern privacy when she states: 
 [T]he watershed for both U.S. abortion rights and 
the right to privacy is the Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. 
Wade, in which the Court held the right to choose 
abortion is a “liberty” protected in its “privacy” from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion by the substantive 
due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Striking down Texas’s criminal abortion law, Roe also 
held that the state had no compelling interest in 
                                                 
102 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
103 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
104  MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1088 (citations omitted). 
105 On the pro-choice movement, see generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE 
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE:  ABORTION POLICY IN 
THE STATES (2001); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT:  ORGANIZATION 
AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991). 
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legislating to preserve fetal life until after viability, and 
that the fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.106 
Roe stands for the rule that while it is necessary to consider the 
impact on others when we exercise our liberties (the right to abortion in 
this case), those “others” must be parties within the state’s protection.107  
Until a fetus is viable, it is deemed not within the state’s protection, and 
the state cannot interfere with the mother’s rights.108  Generally, we may 
exercise our rights without hurting others; because the fetus is not a 
“someone else,” women can exercise their rights without the state’s 
interference.109 
Professors teach the simple rule that when dealing with government 
interference in decisions concerning our private bodies, the rights of the 
individual trump the government’s interest.110  The idea that a woman is 
the ultimate master of her own body and personal space is underscored 
in cases involving the rights of the father of a fetus who claims he has a 
right to notice, a right to an opinion regarding the choice of abortion, or 
an option to raise the child himself.111  For example, Professor 
MacKinnon instructs that in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth112 “the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state cannot 
constitutionally give husbands a veto power over their wives’ first 
trimester abortion decision because the state does not itself have this 
power.”113   
Professor MacKinnon’s analysis of the import of Roe, and the lesson’s 
pertinence to discussions of the Suleman facts, is not unique.  In fact, 
most texts teach modern law students the cases in a similar manner.  The 
casebook authored by William Eskridge, Jr. and Nan Hunter, entitled 
                                                 
106 MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1218 (citations omitted). 
107 See Melissa Neiman, Motorcycle Helmet Laws:  The Facts, What Can Be Done to Jump-Start 
Helmet Use, and Ways to Cap Damages, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 215, 239 (2008) (stating 
that the liberal philosophy of helmet regulation is that riding without a helmet does not 
affect others and thus belongs in the “private, unregulated sphere”); James Griffin, The 
Human Right to Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 697, 706 (2007) (“For instance, it is the form of 
John Stuart Mill's principle of liberty:  freedom of action unless harm to others.”). 
108 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
109 ROBERT H. BLANK, MOTHER AND FETUS:  CHANGING NOTIONS OF MATERNAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 99–100 (1992). 
110 See Lawrence J. Nelson, Of Persons and Prenatal Humans:  Why the Constitution Is Not 
Silent on Abortion, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 189 (2009). 
111 See Christopher Bruno, A Right to Decide Not to be a Legal Father:  Gonzales v. Carhart 
and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 141, 142–44 (2008). 
112 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
113  MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1225 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 70). 
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Sexuality, Gender, and the Law, presents Roe similarly, noting that it 
recognized a “fundamental right” of a woman to choose what and how 
her body is used.114  Citing the argument of Roe’s attorney Sarah 
Weddington that “because pregnancy to a woman is one of the most 
determinative aspects of her life, it is of fundamental importance that she 
have the freedom to terminate it.”115  Similarly, in Mary Jo Frug’s Women 
and the Law, editors Judith Greenberg, Martha Minow, and Dorothy 
Roberts present Roe in the context that an individual’s body, for both 
men and women, is the foundation of one’s personhood, an important 
source of self-knowledge, and as an important boundary between 
themselves and others.116  Additionally, the editors discuss cases that 
present legal reform efforts post-Roe, premised on the claim that women 
should have more control of their own bodies.117  In Gender and Law and 
Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory, Katharine Bartlett, with Deborah 
Rhode and Martha Chamallas, respectively, follows MacKinnon’s 
approach by teaching privacy law as a personal right to be protected 
from government intrusion.118   
These excellent casebook presentations of the current lines of privacy 
law cannot alone answer the questions raised by the Suleman facts 
because these facts could not have been anticipated.  However, that 
means only that the texts must be supplemented in order to address the 
impact of technology on privacy.   
To be clear, we do not suggest that a casebook author should be 
expected to anticipate all such future questions, and it is not practical to 
suggest casebooks be repeatedly revised to attempt to specifically ask the 
questions necessary to teach students to think beyond the current law.  
We do suggest, however, that legal education can present the rules of 
case law in a way that welcomes unanswered questions.   
The remainder of this Article presents four guideposts to frame a 
discussion of any modern issue of the intersection of technology and 
privacy.  The Nadya Suleman example is used to demonstrate the 
application of the guideposts for enhancing traditional case/Socratic 
teaching of the rules of law set forth in the preceding discussion. 
                                                 
114 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 73, at 30–31. 
115 Id. at 30. 
116 JUDITH G. GREENBERG ET AL., WOMEN AND THE LAW 649 (3d ed. 2004). 
117 Id. at 649–51. 
118 KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW:  THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 852–54 (4th ed. 2006); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 45–53 (2d ed. 2003). 
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D. Four Guideposts for Classroom Discussion  
With history as our best example, we see that when questions of 
personal liberties are emerging faster than case law can answer them, the 
discussion roundtable provides the framework necessary to study those 
issues.119  We offer four guideposts for discussion as a framework for 
teaching law students how to examine the intersection of privacy and 
technology.  Although not intended to be exhaustive, these guideposts 
can build on an understanding of the law achieved through 
case/Socratic method and should produce thoughtful discussion that 
will prepare law students to solve tomorrow’s privacy dilemmas.  
1. Identify the Facts and the Role Technology Played in Creating the 
Situation 
Students should begin with a summary of the relevant facts.  By way 
of example, a summary of the Nadya Suleman facts follows.  
 After in vitro fertilization, thirty-three-year-old 
divorced and single mother Nadya Suleman gave birth 
to eight children on January 26, 2009 in Bellflower, 
California.120  She already had six children, ranging in 
age from two to seven.  All fourteen of her children were 
conceived through in vitro fertilization, the last eight 
using remaining embryos from the previous in vitro 
procedure.121  A team of 46 doctors, nurses and surgical 
assistants, stationed in four delivery rooms at the 
Bellflower Medical Center in California, delivered the 
infants.122  She gave birth to two girls and six boys, who 
joined her six other children.123  Medical experts 
estimated the cost of delivering the infants and caring 
for them until they are healthy enough to leave the 
hospital at $1.5 million to $3 million.124  
                                                 
119 See supra Part II (discussing the structure and content of seminars on law, privacy, and 
gender before a body of case law had developed). 
120 Associated Press, California:  And Babies Make 14, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at A14. 
121 Randal C. Archibold et al., Octuplets, 6 Siblings, and Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2009, at A14. 
122 Dan Childs et al., Octuplets’ Mom:  Can She Afford to Raise 14 Kids?, ABC News, Feb. 2, 
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/WomensHealth/story?id=6774471&page=1. 
123 Archibold et al., supra note 121. 
124 MSNBC.com staff, Octuplets’ mom on food stamps, publicist says, NBC Today Show, Feb. 
2, 2009, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29110391/from/ET/. 
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 This is not the first time that Ms. Suleman received 
in vitro fertilization. Ms. Suleman had spent at least 
$24,000 on her first in vitro fertilization procedure, 
which resulted in the birth of her first four children.125  
After receiving an inheritance from her aunt, Ms. 
Suleman used an undisclosed amount to conceive twins 
through in vitro fertilization.126  Frozen eggs left over 
from the second pregnancy were used to conceive the 
octuplets.127  In all, West Coast IVF in Beverly Hills, 
California performed six in vitro fertilization procedures 
on Ms. Suleman.128  
 In the last in vitro fertilization procedure, Ms. 
Suleman’s doctor believed that only one or two embryos 
would implant and grow.  Instead, all six proved viable 
and two of them split into twins, resulting in 
octuplets.129  When Ms. Suleman learned she was 
expecting multiple babies, doctors gave her the option of 
selectively reducing the number of embryos, but she 
declined.130  In a delivery by cesarean section that lasted 
less than five minutes, doctors, who anticipated seven 
children, were surprised to discover an eighth child.131  
 No law dictates how many embryos can be placed in 
a mother’s womb.132  Even so, fertility doctors generally 
follow guidelines that recommend doctors take account 
of the mother’s physical and mental condition and home 
life.133  
 As of the date of this writing, Ms. Suleman is 
unemployed and is collecting $490 in food stamps per 
                                                 
125 Associated Press, Suleman Worked Hard for Those Babies, NBC Miami News, Apr. 10, 
2009, http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/us_world/Suleman-Worked-Hard-for-those-
Babies.html. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Sharon Otterman, Mother of Octuplets Names Fertility Clinic, N.Y. TIMES NEWS BLOG, 
Feb. 9, 2009, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/octo-mom-names-fertility-
clinic/?emc=eta1. 
129 Mike Celizic, First look:  Octuplet mom shows off babies, NBC Today Show, Feb. 9, 2009, 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29086126/from/ET/. 
130 Jessica Garrison et al., Mother of octuplets already has twins, four other children, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/la-me-octuplets30-2009jan30,0, 
6314319.story. 
131 Id. 
132 Associated Press, California Medical Board probes octuplet birth, NBC Today Show, Feb. 
6, 2009, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29057426/from/ET/. 
133 Id.  
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week.134  Following an on-the-job injury in 1999, she has 
collected more than $165,000 in state disability 
payments.135  Although she is weighing book, television, 
newspaper, and movie requests,136 she has also been 
lambasted by talk-show hosts, fertility experts, and even 
her own mother, whose hands are full caring for Ms. 
Suleman’s other children.137  
The first of the four guideposts for analysis is perhaps the most 
literal.  Students should be asked to list exhaustively the specific ways in 
which technology has contributed to the fact pattern at issue.   
Analyzing the Suleman fact pattern, technological advances create 
and/or affect the following: 
• The process of in-vitro fertilization; 
• Implantation of multiple frozen embryos; 
• Multiple embryos successfully implanting;  
• Mother’s decision not to terminate any of the eight embryos 
after successful implantation; 
• Prenatal advances that allow term pregnancy of octuplets; 
• Delivery of octuplets; and 
• Healthcare advances in the care of multiples. 
After identifying the specific roles technology played in creating the 
facts of the situation, students should be encouraged to identify related 
issues or questions. 
2. Consider Who Should Resolve the Issues Created by the Particular 
Intersection of Technology and Privacy 
Law professors usually direct students to case law to find answers to 
legal issues.  In the arena of privacy law, however, it is appropriate to 
question whether the judicial branch is the branch best placed to answer 
the questions posed.  Students will consider who should resolve the issues 
they identified after reviewing the facts. 
Some authors have suggested that American courts “lack the 
institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy implications of new 
technologies they encounter.”138  Some assert that judges are not 
                                                 
134 Supra note 124. 
135 Id. 
136 Archibold et al., supra note 121. 
137 Associated Press, Octuplets mom getting outrage rather than gifts, NBC Today Show, Feb. 
3, 2009, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29002731/. 
138 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858 (2004). 
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properly suited to define privacy when new technology is involved 
because “[j]udicially created rules also lack necessary flexibility; they 
cannot change quickly and cannot test various regulatory 
approaches.”139  Beyond these arguments, serious constitutional 
implications are involved in determining who should decide these 
issues. 
In their book Judicial Dictatorship, William J. Quirk and R. Randall 
Bridwell remind us that law professors should be asking not only how 
the Supreme Court might rule on a given fact pattern, but also whether 
the Supreme Court should be answering the question at all.140  Professors 
Quirk and Bridwell suggest:  
The traditional view was that the separation of powers 
made the legislature and executive responsible for 
change and the Court the guardian of continuity and 
stability.  The Court, however, over the past thirty years, 
has made itself the major agent for change—one that 
operates without democratic check to accomplish ends 
that could not be achieved by democratic process.141 
Students should thoughtfully consider which branch of government 
should determine the limits of privacy or, in the Suleman case, whether 
any protection guarantees a woman’s right to conceive multiple children 
with the assistance of medical technology.  Questions to be considered 
are:  Is a profession or professional entity involved?  Is that entity or 
profession regulated by a state agency?  Should that agency or the 
legislature be defining the rights and roles? 
If the courts should not answer the questions raised by the 
intersection of privacy and technology, then who should? 
Some argue that executive agencies are more appropriate to resolve 
certain issues because they are more accountable to the people than are 
federal judges.142  Applying this logic, students may wish to discuss 
whether the health and health policy aspects of the Suleman example 
suggest that executive agencies ought to regulate prospective mothers’ 
                                                 
139 Id. at 859. 
140 See generally WILLIAM J. QUIRK & R. RANDALL BRIDWELL, JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP 
(1995). 
141 Id. at xv. 
142 Glen Staszewski, Reason Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1261 (2009) 
(“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within 
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is. . . .”); see also REGAN, supra note 4. 
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fertility choices if those choices involve giving birth to multiple children.  
If welfare funds and health services are involved, perhaps executive 
agencies are best suited to regulate these matters.   
Students should consider whether the legislative branch is the most 
appropriate for resolving the rights to use technology to mother multiple 
children.  The legislative solution has often been rejected for privacy 
issues because “it is difficult to conceptualize privacy, especially for 
purposes of formulating policy.”143  Still others assert that the focus on 
judicial protection of privacy ignores Congress’s success in defining and 
protecting privacy.144  Considering all these views, students should be 
asked how they might draft a law defining privacy relative to 
technologically-assisted fertility and to identify the difficulties of 
legislating in this area.   
In resolving this debate, law professors should ask students to 
consider additional factors, such as whether the mother’s need for 
governmental assistance to raise children should make a difference in 
access to medical technology by which the children are conceived, born, 
and assisted in survival?  Does this factor affect which body, if any, 
should be defining permissible actions? 
Although the debate likely will be resolved, like so many before, in 
the courts, law students should examine which branch of government or 
what body is best suited constitutionally to resolve the issues created by 
a particular intersection of technology and privacy.145 
3. Assuming the Courts Will Resolve the Issues, Examine Cases That 
Provide Insight and Explore Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation 
Even realizing that case law does not provide the only source for 
resolution of these issues and that other branches are arguably 
                                                 
143 REGAN, supra note 4, at 3 (“As a value, privacy is important, but as a goal for public 
policy, privacy remains ambiguous.”). 
144 Kerr, supra note 138, at 856. 
145 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003) (stating the constitutional 
protection afforded to personal decisions relating to marriage and procreation); see also Poe 
v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D. Kan. 1972).  The court stated:  
Even though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, an 
individual has long been recognized to have retained his right to 
individual autonomy and privacy and that this right carries over into 
the marital relationship. Consequently, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the existence of a right to care for one's own health, to 
personal autonomy, to marry, to have offspring, to use contraceptives, 
to direct the upbringing and education of one's children, as well as the 
right to travel. 
Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). 
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empowered to decide the issues, students must understand that case law 
continues to guide the resolution of such issues.146  Unless there is a 
major shift, American courts will continue to resolve these issues of 
privacy. 147  Therefore, students need to identify specific cases or lines of 
cases that provide insight to analysis of the issue and to understand why 
the cases were decided as they were.  This demonstrates the necessity of 
using the traditional casebook teaching method in conjunction with the 
roundtable discussion. 
Professors have traditionally taught law students that:  
 [Roe v. Wade] held the right to choose abortion is a 
“liberty” protected in its “privacy” from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion by the substantive due process 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Striking 
down Texas’s criminal abortion law, Roe also held that 
the state had no compelling interest in legislating to 
preserve fetal life until after viability.148 
If this constitutional analysis is applied to situations like the Suleman 
scenario, law students will have to answer whether the substantive due 
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment also protects a 
woman’s right to conceive multiple children with the assistance of 
technology.  If the state has no compelling interest in legislating to 
preserve fetal life, can it legislate to prevent conception of life or lives 
through medical assistance?  Does it make any difference if the mother 
intends to conceive a single or multiple babies? 
In deciding Roe and other cases like Danforth, the Court was not 
considering the facts students will be examining in this current exercise.  
Arguably, the Court could not have imagined the opinion in Roe being 
used to dissect a fact pattern involving the conception and birth of eight 
babies.  Considering the technological advances at play here, one might 
ask whether the Court could have dreamed of the current process of in 
vitro fertilization, prenatal care that permits term pregnancy of octuplets, 
and neonatal care sufficient to allow multiple tiny babies to survive.  It is 
not a new or simple question how to apply case precedent to decide later 
issues involving facts not remotely within the consideration of the 
original Court.   
                                                 
146 ALICE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, PRIVACY RIGHTS:  CASES LOST AND CAUSES WON BEFORE 
THE SUPREME COURT 195 (2006). 
147 Id.  
148 MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 1218 (citation omitted). 
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Two major theories—Originalism and the Living Constitution—seek 
to resolve this dispute over how to factor change into constitutional 
interpretation.  Students should be exposed to both theories.   
Originalism asserts that:  
[w]hen the original Constitution was ratified, and when 
amendments were added to it over the course of years, a 
particular meaning was enacted, and judges are not 
given the authority to change that meaning. The role of a 
judge is to say what the Constitution does mean, not 
what it ought to mean; if change is needed, Article V sets 
out the procedure by which it can be amended. 
Allowing judges to have free rein to change the meaning 
of the Constitution to suit the perceived needs of the day 
takes sovereignty away from the American people and 
places it in the hands of an unelected judiciary. 
Adherence to original understanding, by contrast, 
prevents judges from imposing their own values.  
Originalists thus argue that constitutional cases should 
be decided according to our best guess as to how the 
ratifiers would have decided them. Judges should 
protect a right to abortion only if the ratifiers would 
have agreed that it existed. . . .  Anything else, 
originalists say, is illegitimate (or even “activist”). 
 The standard argument for the living Constitution 
focuses on the fact that conditions and attitudes have 
changed greatly since the framers’ times. Living 
constitutionalists argue that the Constitution must be 
able to adapt to respond to current needs and problems 
rather than remaining frozen in time. Because the 
amendment process is so difficult and cumbersome, 
requiring a two-thirds majority in both the House and 
the Senate and then ratification by the legislatures of 
three-quarters of the states, living constitutionalists seem 
to view judicial modification of the Constitution with 
equanimity—a necessary evil, at the worst. Without 
judicial changes, they say, states would still be allowed 
to segregate schools, ban interracial marriage, and 
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exclude women from the practice of law, to give just a 
few prominent examples.149 
In his article Abortion and Original Meaning, Jack M. Balkin writes that 
when contemplating the constitutional basis for the decision in Roe, the 
“choice between original meaning and living constitutionalism is a false 
choice,” and he suggests an alternative approach.150  Balkin first 
considers the critics of Roe who deride the decision under the theory of 
Orginalism, claiming that the “right of privacy” is not specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution.151  These critics claim there is no 
constitutional basis as contemplated by the Framers and adopters of the 
Constitution for protection of a privacy right for a woman’s choice to 
have an abortion.152  In comparison, Balkin notes that the Living 
Constitution theory is rooted in the incorrect premise that interpretation 
based on original meaning will leave our Constitution inflexible and 
unable to meet the challenges brought on by a changing society as well 
as technology.153 
Balkin urges that both of these criticisms are wrong and offers a 
third option—that Roe is based on the “constitutional text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the principles that underlie it.”154  He 
distinguishes between an analysis of the decision based on the original 
meaning of the constitutional text versus one based on original expected 
application.155  Under Balkin’s interpretation of original expected 
meaning, he argues that even though the Framers did not expect or 
intend the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to abortion, they 
nonetheless intended that principles of equal protection and prohibition 
against class legislation that underlie the Fourteenth Amendment would 
support “anti-subordination” of one person’s rights over another’s and 
therefore a right to privacy.156 
Balkin rejects the assumption that faithfulness to the text means 
faithfulness to the original expected application.157  Rather, he argues, 
“constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the original meaning of 
the Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text.”158  In other 
                                                 
149 Kermit Roosevelt, Originalism and the Living Constitution:  Reconciliation, ACS Issue 
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150 Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007). 
151 Id. at 291. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 293. 
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words, Balkin claims that interpretation should look to original meaning 
and underlying principles and decide how best to apply them in current 
circumstances. 159  He calls this approach “text and principle.”160 
Whether we conclude Professor Balkin is correct, or not, this 
problem of changing circumstances, created by technological advances, 
is what makes the contemplation of different theories of constitutional 
interpretation so important.  Asking students to consider how they view 
the Constitution and how that view affects the application to changing 
fact patterns furnishes them additional tools to deal with the changing 
way we exercise privacy rights.   
Additionally, applying Balkin’s “text and principle” theory becomes 
particularly challenging when applying the theory to the Suleman facts.  
Balkin’s argument—that the right of privacy is founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment principle of anti-subordination of one person’s 
choice to another person’s choice—produces new and unique questions 
when these choices create overlapping zones of privacy.  Students 
should ponder whether Balkin’s emphasis on “plasticity, contestability 
or fluidity of underlying principles” may result in inconsistent 
interpretations when circumstances change.161  In situations such as 
Nadya Suleman’s choice to utilize technology, we encounter the issue of 
whose choice should prevail when choices conflict?  How should a court 
reconcile these rights?  What considerations are relevant?   
Discussing these two major schools of interpretation along with 
ideas like Balkin’s variation will prompt students to think about how 
they view the Constitution.  They should be encouraged to think about 
how to interpret the document, what that means to the issue at hand, 
and what their own philosophy of interpretation will be. 
4. Address the Implications for Allocation of Resources 
In reviewing the Suleman facts, not only will the advances in 
medical technology that allowed conception and viable birth of these 
babies be important, but so will the costs to society of allowing the birth 
of these children; some of those costs are social but most often they will 
be calculated in terms of economic cost to the state and to others.162  In 
addition to new debates over the right to conceive and to give birth,163 
Suleman’s delivery of octuplets has led many to ask what right, if any, 
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such a mother has to expect the assistance of state funds to assist her in 
caring for her children.164  Therefore, in addition to addressing 
technology’s creation of new factual scenarios, students must be 
encouraged to factor the role of limited resources into the equation. 
The allocation of resources—that is, balancing needs and resources—
is not a new analysis to law.  In fact, Professors Emma Coleman Jordan 
and Angela P. Harris have compiled an entire textbook to help students 
examine these important issues.  In Economic Justice, Professors Jordan 
and Harris focus on engaging students in understanding both economics 
and social justice.165  Professors Jordan and Harris observe that the 
United States constitutional structure protects some rights—political and 
civil rights—but not others, namely social and economic rights.166  In 
other words, the constitutional law is defined as protecting citizens from 
abuse of government power, but does not require the government to 
provide its citizens with anything.167 
Given scarce economic resources and with increasing numbers of 
Americans dependent on government economic assistance, disputes over 
an individual’s consumption of resources through the exercise of 
personal rights are inevitable.  The consumption of resources is perhaps 
the most striking example of modern conflict resulting from technology’s 
narrowing of the space between an individual’s choice and the impact of 
that choice on others. 
To address the interplay of economics and privacy in the Suleman 
factual scenario, students should look to instances where the Supreme 
Court has recognized limitations, particularly in allocation of scarce 
resources.  Examples of this include Harris v. McRae, in which the 
Supreme Court decided that freedom of personal choice does not require 
federal Medicaid programs to fund medically necessary abortions.168  
Rather, the Court said that “the freedom of a woman to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy” was guaranteed.169  Harris marked the 
Court’s attempt to circumscribe the constitutionally guaranteed freedom 
and subordinate it to the specific social goals and allocations.170  In other 
words, Harris recognized a woman’s right to decide whether to terminate 
her pregnancy, while also denying any obligation on the state to expend 
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limited resources to pay for it—in effect, a barrier to carrying out her 
choice.171  Do the Suleman facts suggest a different conclusion?  
Students may also wish to consider C.K. v. Shalala.172  In this decision, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a so-called “family cap” 
provision, which eliminated the standard increase in welfare funding 
provided for additional children born to an individual currently 
receiving welfare funding.173  Claiming that the “family cap” was not an 
example of the state’s attempt to influence the behavior of men and 
women, the court found that the cap merely imposes a ceiling on benefits 
accorded through welfare funding, permitting any additional children to 
share in that “capped” family income.  The court also held that the cap 
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.174  
Further, the court stated that “it is well-settled that decisions about 
family composition, conception, and childbirth fall into a constitutionally 
protected zone of privacy.”175  A state may not hinder an individual’s 
exercise of protected choices; however, the state is not obligated to 
remove obstacles that it did not create, including lack of financial 
resources.176 
For thirty years now we have understood that a woman’s right to 
make choices about her body, as recognized in Roe, is a constitutionally 
protected right of privacy within certain limitations.177  With the advent 
of reproductive technology unforeseen when Roe was decided, we now 
must debate further questions:  Does the right to privacy guarantee a 
woman the right to employ reproductive technology to bear multiple 
children, anticipating that the state will bear some of the cost of care for 
the children?  If Roe is the best source for defining a woman’s right not to 
have children, is it the starting point to answer whether a woman has a 
right to have a child (or many children) supported by welfare funds?  
Tomorrow’s legal scholars will have to answer the question whether the 
extraordinary fact that Nadya Suleman conceived multiple fetuses with 
technological assistance, and/or in anticipation of state support, should 
play any role in defining those fetuses’ right to exist (as distinct from the 
single conventionally conceived fetus at issue in Roe).  Is the ability of 
these children to contribute back to society a factor when deciding the 
                                                 
171 Id. at 316–17. 
172 C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995), aff’d sub nom. C.K. v. New Jersey Dept. 
of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996). 
173 Id. at 1015. 
174  Id. at 1013. 
175 Id. at 1014. 
176 Id. 
177 Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 255, 280 (1992). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/2
2009] Age of Octomom 421 
allocation of finite resources?  And, again, which branch of government 
should answer these questions? 
Our previous understanding of the delineation between zones of 
privacy and the allocation of limited resources is premised upon certain 
known truths, that is to say, that multiple births are rare and occur 
randomly.  However, it is now possible for a welfare mother of six to 
employ technology in order to conceive an additional eight children and 
then present them to the state for support.178  Technology and the 
allocation of scarce resources have collided; tomorrow’s lawyers will 
have to clean up the debris. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Every day, individuals like Nadya Suleman make private decisions 
that will affect indefinable numbers of people both now and in the 
future.  Disputes will be brought to governors, legislators, and judges, 
with requests for new rules about how and where one is guaranteed 
freedom to exercise private rights.  The concept of privacy from Griswold, 
Roe, and their progeny will necessarily evolve, and these cases will frame 
new debates seeking answers to questions raised by the intersection of 
privacy and technology.  Specifically, who decides and who pays? 
Tomorrow’s lawyers will be called upon to debate where private 
rights end, where the state’s right to preserve resources begins, and 
which branch of government should draw the lines between the two.  In 
order to prepare law students to participate in this process, law 
professors must look for new ways to teach law students how to frame 
the issues.  Having explored the facts of the Nadya Suleman story by 
way of example and having presented an instruction format of four 
guideposts for structured class discussion, we call for a return to the 
seminar roundtable. 
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